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MODELING OF COMMERCIAL MARITIME PORT RECOVERABILITY 
FROM SECURITY DISRUPTIONS: WORK-IN-PROGRESS  
  
C. Ariel Pinto, Ph.D., Old Dominion University 




This article describes active research in commercial 
maritime port’s recovery from security disruptions 
which explores the synergy of economic and 
simulation models in investigating the recoverability of 
ports after security incidents. Previous study has 
identified decision variables and throughput simulation 
models of port operation. However, none of these 
models have been utilized to investigate port’s 
recovery from a security disruption and in evaluating 
recoverability investments. The method of research 
includes analysis of recorded disruptions, identification 
of impediments to recovery and investment criteria for 
recoverability. This article provides managers insight 
into including security and continuity of operation in 
managing various types of systems.  
 
Introduction 
The U.S. Coast Guard has moved aggressively since 
9/11 to provide for maritime security – e.g., the 
creation of the High Interest Vessel Boarding Program, 
the deployment of Coast Guard personnel as “Sea 
Marshalls” aboard certain ships entering and leaving 
ports, and the establishment of port security zones 
around ships and high-risk port facilities.  
On November 25, 2002, the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was signed into 
law and was designed to protect the nation’s ports and 
waterways from a terrorist attack. The MTSA is based 
upon a risk-based methodology and focuses on those 
maritime industry sectors that have higher risks of 
incurring transportation security disruptions. The 
MTSA requires the establishment of committees in the 
nation’s ports to coordinate the activities of port 
stakeholders, e.g., shipping lines, shippers, 
longshoremen, shipping agents, the recreational 
boating public and various port-related federal, state 
and local agencies.  In essence, the focus of the MTSA 
is to prevent security disruptions in the maritime 
supply chain, i.e., in the movement of maritime cargo 
from shipper to consignee, with the emphasis on the 
port link of the chain.  
The research community has also responded to the 
events of 9/11. A number of recent studies have 
investigated risk and security in general and in ports 
and the supply chain. Leung et al. (2004) emphasized 
the importance of a critical infrastructure such as a 
bridge to recover from failure incidents. Together with 
other properties such as redundancy and robustness, 
system recoverability is critical for system-wide risk 
management. Harrald et al. (2004) presented a 
framework for sustainable port security that includes 
port-security prevention (pre-attack) and mitigation 
and recovery (consequence) programs. The framework 
is based on two perspectives: the causal chain of events 
leading to security incident and the system of systems 
nature of ports. As such, ports are critical nodes in the 
complex economic inter-modal subsystems that move 
goods and cargo around the world. For example, a 
container facility is tightly coupled with the inter-
modal rail yard and the tightly scheduled container 
vessels. 
Chopra and Sodhi (2004) investigated the stress-
testing of the supply chain by running exercises based 
on what-if scenarios. These exercises identify 
subsystems (or links) within the supply chain, the 
various risk scenarios the subsystems may experience 
and the effects to the overall chain. The study notes 
that one of the best defenses against a supply chain 
failure is a well-designed and communicated recovery 
process. 
To date, there have been significant improvements 
in securing U.S. ports, i.e., the investigation of ex ante 
security disruptions since the events of September 11, 
2001. However, there has been little or no investigation 
of ex post port security disruptions, i.e., the 
recoverability once a security disruption has occurred. 
Possibly, this is due to the absence of any major 
security-related disruption at U.S. ports. 
However, port security disruptions cannot be 
prevented with certainty. An optimal port security 
disruption prevention and recovery strategy is one that 
maximizes the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs) 
of such a strategy, where the benefits are the cost 
savings to the port from the strategy and the costs are 
those attributed to the strategy -- thereby providing an 
efficient allocation of security-disruption resources 
among the competing activities of prevention and 
recovery. It is expected that law-makers, policy-makers 
and the maritime industry itself in the near future will 
place greater emphasis on recovery issues related to 
port security disruptions (Maritime and Port Security 
Summit, 2004). Thus, a potential high-yield study is 
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one that contributes towards the analysis of recovery 
strategies after a security disruption. 
 
Specific Aims 
The focus of the research is to address port’s recovery 
from security disruptions. The highly uncertain nature 
of security disruptions and the commercial orientation 
of maritime ports make this topic well suited from the 
fields of economics, logistics, and risk modeling, 
assessment, and management.  
The particular aims of this research are embodied 
in a set of questions that will provide direction to 
research activities in a port’s recovery from security 
disruptions. These questions are: 
- What are the potential security disruptions to a 
port? 
- What are the impediments to recoverability? 
- How can we analyze recovery strategies?  
 
Accidental disruptions. Recovery strategies from any 
type of disruption depend highly on specific 
characteristics of the disruption, and are designed 
based on experience and analysis of event records. 
However, there has never been any recorded major 
security incident in a commercial port in the U.S. As 
such, describing a security disruption to a port is not a 
trivial exercise but will require an analysis of non-
security related disruptions and an extension of the 
analysis to potential security-disruption scenarios. 
An investigation of port accidents in 95 countries 
can help classify such accidents by type, origin and 
cause (Darbra and Casal 2004), and location (Ronza et 
al. 2003). The origins of the accidents are (a) transport 
of cargo (56.5%), (b) loading and unloading operations 
(14.9%), and (c) other origins (process plant, storage, 
waste and warehouse facilities) (28.6%). Among 
accidents originating from the transport of cargo, 
majority (65%) involve ocean-going vessels’ 
movements in and out of port and ship maneuvering 
within port, followed by pipeline accidents (12%). The 
causes of the accidents were collision between ships or 
between a ship and dry land or between truck and rail 
vehicles (46%), mechanical failures (18.1%), Human 
error (15.9%), and external causes such as high winds 
and fires (17.0%). 
Accidents can also be classified in terms of types 
such as releases and loss of containment (51%), fires 
(29%), and explosions (17%); and in terms of its 
location of occurrence such as the sea during approach 
and maneuver (40%), on land during storage, process 
and transport (21%), and at a sea-land interface during 
loading/unloading and maintenance (39%). The most 
common types of substances involved in port accidents 
are crude oil and other oil products. Port accidents that 
involve the handling and temporary storage of 
hazardous cargo in port areas originate from the nature 
of port activities – e.g., hardware failures of ship, 
inland and loading/unloading equipment and external 
events such as bad weather (Christou, 1999).  
 
Potential security disruptions. Obviously, there are 
security disruptions that are not aptly represented by 
the accidents described above. In particularly, possible 
terrorism related disruptions such as nuclear attacks, 
poison gas attacks, dirty bomb explosions, or 
commandeered container trucks and ships have not 
been recorded yet. Using decomposition to facilitate 
the analysis of possible security disruptions to a port 
leads to three subsystems of analysis: physical security, 
information or cyber security, and personnel security, 
as suggested by Roberts (2004) as shown in Exhibit 2. 
These three subsystems provide technologist, security 
experts, and system analysts possible approaches to 
analyzing the port as a whole.  
 
Exhibit 2.  Decomposition of Port for Security 
Incident Analysis. 
 
Security disruptions to a Port













Decomposition of a recorded major accident into 
critical data elements may be performed using a 
method adapted from Lincoln et al. (2004). This 
method identifies six key data elements: activity area, 
task, contributing factor, precipitating mechanism, 
incident event and outcome. These elements are 
described in the tables below. This method facilitates 
extraction of data from narrative text of recorded 
incidents and aids in the development of the potential 
incident scenarios. 
The following two cases of recorded vessel and 
port accidents are decomposed into key data elements: 
Case I: Fire aboard the tug Scandia and the 
subsequent grounding of the tug and the tank barge 
North Cape on moonstone beach south Kingston, Jan 
19, 1996. 
Summary: On Friday afternoon Jan 19 ,1996 ,the 
U S tug Scandia had an engine room fire while towing 
the unmanned US tank barge North cape ,4.5 miles Off 
point Judith ,Rohde Island .All six crewmembers 
abandoned the Scandia and 10-foot 25-knot winds .The 
crew was unsuccessful in its attempts to release the 
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anchor of the barge ,which rans around and spilled 
828,000 gallons of home heating oil, causing the 
largest pollution incident in Rohde island history. 
Sequence of events: 
- Tug Scandia departed bay one enroute to 
providence, Rhode Island. 
- Scandia was pushing an unmanned barge which 
contains 4,074 gallons of heating oil as soon as tug left 
New York harbor, it switched from pushing to towing 
the North Cape.  
- Captain of tug Scandia requested and received a 
faxed whether forecast from fleet Whether.  
- Friday noon, captain started losing visibility 
because of fog.  
- He asked chief engineer for check up and chief 
engineer found everything fine . 
- One of the crewmembers standing in the gallery 
and saw smoke coming from top. 
- He Informed tanker man about 
smoke.Immdiatly sirens are activated, vessel 
monitoring system panel started.  
- Crew bought portable (co2) fire extinguisher 
but unable to control fire  
- Captain reported coast guard about 
uncontrollable fire on vessel and asked for help. 
- Captain and crew members’ wore sea suits  
- Seaferrer vessel arrived to help crew members 
and rescued them  
Case 2: - Ramming of the eads bridge by barges in 
tow of the M/V Anna Holly with subsequent ramming 
and near breakaway of the president casino on the 
admiral St. Louis Harbor, Missouri April 4, 1998.    
 Summary: On April 4, 1998 a tow of M/V Anna 
Holly, which was traveling northbound on the 
Mississippi river through the St. Louis Harbor, struck 
the Missouri-side pier of the center span of the Eads 
Bridge. Eight barges broke away and drifted back 
through the Missouri span. Three of these barges 
drifted toward the president casino on the admiral, a 
permanently moored gaming vessel below the bridge 
on the Missouri side of the river. The drifting barges 
struck the moored admiral, causing most of it’s 
mooring lines to break .The admiral then rotated away 
from the Missouri riverbank .the captain of Anna Holly 
disengaged his vessel from the remaining barges in the 
tow and placed the Anna Holly’s bow against the 
Admirals bow to hold it against the bank. Fifty people 
suffered injuries people were killed and an estimated 
damage $11 million. 
 Sequence of events: 
- Anna Holly was traveling from northbound 
Mississippi river through St. Louis harbor. 
- At about 18:30 got underway from fleeting area 
(upstream Minnesota, consists of 12 barges) 
- Captain radioed and request for help at coast 
guard to assist Anna Holly through bridges.  
- Captain asked chief engineer to do routine 
check ups Captain directed tow to the right of the eads 
bridge center span 
- Steering light was not lit, so captain 
maneuvered Anna holly close to the middle of the 
arched center span and Vessel started to begin slow.  
- Anna holly stalled (halted by water current) 
- Headway stopped and current caused to drift 
sideways towards Missouri side pier of the edge bridge 
8 barges broke away the tow  
- The drifting barges struck moored caused most 
of its mooring   lines to break  
- Captain disengaged vessel and placed Anna 
holly’s bow against Admiral’s bow to hold it against 
the bank  
 
Impediments to recovery. Ports are likely to 
experience a number of impediments to recovering 
from security disruptions. Impediments are factors that 
prevent the instantaneous recovery of a port from a 
security disruption. The identification of these 
impediments can provide critical information in the 
effective design and efficient implementation of 
recovery strategies. 
For any particular security disruption, there can be 
more than one possible recovery strategy. Therefore, 
there is the need to differentiate among recovery 
strategies based on criteria (e.g. cost-benefit, 
throughput, etc.) that are acceptable to the various port 
stakeholders. This is particularly true in light of scarce 
resources. 
Typical concept of recovery pertains to activities 
after real incident such as fire or equipment failure. 
However, the aversion from security related incidents 
and the layered security approach typical of many 
critical infrastructures have lead to the heavy use of 
technologies for early detection of incidents 
(Wolthusen 2001, Chen 2004). Nonetheless, any 
detection systems always have the possibility of false-
positive alarms; wherein an apparent security incident 
actually turns out to be false-alarms. Thus, there are 
two types of recovery activities that will be looked at: 
recovery after a true security incident and recovery 
after a false alarm. 
For a true security incident, expected impediments 
to a port’s recoverability include rebuilding port 
infrastructure (berths); replacement of port mobile 
capital (cranes); federal, state and local government 
regulations; union labor restrictions; and replacement 
of inland-carrier infrastructure and mobile capital. The 
time required for a port to recover from a major port 
infrastructure disruption is in general expected to be 
greater than that from a major port mobile capital 
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disruption. In general, regulations of federal agencies 
are expected to be greater impediments than 
regulations from state and local government agencies.   
For a false alarm, the expected impediments to a 
port’s recoverability will be inherently different from a 
true security incident. Instead of structural 
impediments as described above, impediments such as 
policies set forth by the port operator, the local law 
enforcement agencies, and other policy-based 
restrictions will be more evident.  
 
Analysis of recovery strategies. Talley (1996) 
presented an economic model of port operation which 
identifies performance indicators for evaluating port's 
performance with respect to its economic objective 
over time. It considers demand functions for the port's 
throughputs; prices charged for various services; 
opportunity costs incurred by ocean carriers, inland 
carriers and shippers; port production functions; port 
resource functions; and the costs of port resources. The 
model uses economic objective that maximizes annual 
throughput subject to a profit constraint, equal to zero 
for a public port and some positive value for a private 
port.   
Some of the port performance indicators include: 
ship and vehicle loading and unloading service rates by 
type of cargo; port channel accessibility and reliability; 
port berth accessibility and reliability; entrance and 
departure gate reliability; probabilities of ship, vehicle, 
and cargo damage in port; and probabilities of ship, 
vehicle, and cargo loss (or theft) in port.  With these 
performance indicators, port management can evaluate 
the performance of specific services or service areas 
(e.g., the dock, gates and the port channel) of the port, 
thereby detecting where performance within the port 
has been improving or declining over time.  
This model will be very useful for the analysis of 
security disruption if coupled with a throughput model 
of port operation during recovery. There are several 
recent throughput model of port operation: Leathrum et 
al. (2004) describes a simulation of port operation for 
military purposes; Luo and Grigalunas (2003) 
suggested a spatial-economic approach to modeling a 
port; and Demirci (2003) suggested a simulation of 
additional investment to port operation. However, none 




The primary challenge of the research during the 
preliminary phases is the lack of information on 
security disruptions and recoverability in port 
operation. Nonetheless, records of accidental 
disruptions have been deemed very valuable in creating 
potential security disruptions. These records are also 
very valuable in identifying impediments to 
recoverability. Disruption due to false alarms is 
neglected in previous studies but may prove to be 
important for the case at hand. Lastly, models for 
analyzing port operation, both economic and 
throughput abounds. However, more detailed 
examination of the models is needed to determine their 
suitability for analyzing recoverability issues. 
 Overall, this article summarizes possible approach 
to including security and continuity of operation into 
the management of various types of systems. 
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